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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A.

Issue

This memorandum addresses to what extent the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”)1 can constitutionally issue an exterritorial subpoena to a non-resident witness to testify
before the Court. For the purposes of this memorandum the words “exterritorial” and
“extraterritorial” will be used interchangeably to address subpoenas issued outside the
jurisdiction or boundary of the state. The memorandum will be divided into several sections.
The first analysis section will address the constitutionality of issuing exterritorial subpoenas
by the SC-SL. The second section will address the lack of jurisprudence in Sierra Leone on
this subpoena matter and thus will look at nations with similar constitutions and for guidance
on whether the SC-SL may issue an exterritorial subpoena. The third section will focus on the
duty and obligation of states to cooperate with the SC-SL.
B.

Summary of Conclusions

Examining the Sierra Leone Constitution, the documents that created the SC-SL,
as well as comparing the Sierra Leone Constitution to that of other nations a
sound legal argument can be made that the SC-SL may issue exterritorial
subpoenas to non-resident witnesses.
Despite the fact that the Sierra Leone Constitution2 has had little or no academic or
judicial interpretation, a conclusion can be drawn from the language of its text, that the
President has the power to enter into treaties and therefore the treaty that created the SC-SL
with the United Nations is one which is valid. Understanding the fact that the SC-SL is a

1

Special Court for Sierra Leone will be referred to as “SC-SL” throughout this Memorandum.

2

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 5).
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legally and constitutionally valid body, one may examine the auspices of its rules and
formation agreement to look for language involving the issuance of exterritorial subpoenas.
These “Agreements”3 allow for the SC-SL to enter into treaties with other nations and to issue
orders and requests. As is mentioned in the Constitution of Sierra Leone, any body of the
government that has the power to make laws, may make them to have extraterritorial
operation.4 Therefore the SC-SL can constitutionally issue exterritorial subpoenas to nonresident witnesses to testify before the Court.
The Sierra Leone Government as well as other States have a duty to assist the
SC-SL.
As is instructed in the above-mentioned Agreements,5 the Sierra Leone Government
has created the SC-SL in the hopes of trying those most responsible for the atrocities that
occurred in the country. The duty of the Sierra Leone Government is to assist the SC-SL in
every way possible to insure its success. Third party states also have a duty to assist the SCSL under the obligations of the U.N. Charter. While the Court lacks formal Chapter VII
authority its very creation is a reflection of the wants and needs of the international
community.6 Under the Geneva Convention of 1949 there is a duty to prosecute and

3

see: Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7); The Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 8); SC-SL Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 49).
4

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 5).

5

see: Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7); The Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 8); SC-SL Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 49).
6

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 11 ).
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investigate jus cogens violations.7 There were clearly violations of the Geneva Conventions
that occurred in Sierra Leone and therefore the international community has a duty to assist
the SC-SL to investigate these crimes.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The review of twenty national constitutions adopted over the past fifteen years shows

that the examined constitutions have many common components: a preamble; general
principles of state organization; fundamental rights and freedoms; a system of state
governance including sections on central and local governments, sections on judicial
structures and judicial control of the constitutions, a section on emergency measures; and
some miscellaneous or transitional provisions.8 Some of these common features seem to be
more essential than others. For example, few of the constitutions under the review contain
preambles or sections on local government and judicial review, but virtually every
constitution includes sections on general principles of state organization, fundamental rights,
central government, the judiciary, and procedures for amendments.9 The Constitution of
Sierra Leone10 was created during the time of the one-party government of the APC (All

7

The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field (Geneva Convention 1). The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked members of the Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II). The Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III) The Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV). (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I TAB 4)
8

16 B.U. Int'l L.J. 1, 67 (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 6).

9

16 B.U. Int'l L.J. 1, 67 (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 6).

10

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 Chapter VIII Sec. 172 paragraph 3(a) “any power to make laws
conferred by this constitution includes the power to make laws having extraterritorial operations. (Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook I TAB 5).
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People’s Congress).11 As mentioned above, it has the same characteristics of the surveyed
constitutions. As with new forming and growing countries and constitutions, the lifespan of
the Constitution was short-lived following the overthrow of the government by the (NPRC)
National Provisional Ruling Council.12
One of the potential problems with its creation has been the fact that is has been so
rarely used. One former Sierra Leone Presidential candidate indicated in his article entitled
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Constitution as the Supreme Law of
the Land (“Memorandum”, that the Constitution has been unused and unfamiliar, outside legal
circles, Parliament and arguably the Executive Branch.13 Since it has not been used one must
look at the Constitutions roots in order to interpret its contents. In the Memorandum the
author draws links with the United States Constitution14 and the contents and spirit of its
creation.15 The author goes on to compare specific sections of the United States Constitution
with the Sierra Leone Constitution.16 It is important to understand that this link with the
United States Constitution will play a key role in the interpretation of whether or not the

11

Bankole Thompson, The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995), University Press of
America (1997) at 183. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 1).

12

Bankole Thompson, The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995), University Press of
America (1997) at 184. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 1).

13

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land,
Raymond Bamidele Thompson, Sr. http://www.sierra-leone.org/essay1.html (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I TAB 43).

14

United States Constitution (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 47).

15

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land,
Raymond Bamidele Thompson, Sr. http://www.sierra-leone.org/essay1.html(Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I TAB 1).

16

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land,
Raymond Bamidele Thompson, Sr. http://www.sierra-leone.org/essay1.html(Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I TAB 1).
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issuance of extraterritorial subpoenas by the SC-SL is legal under the Sierra Leone
Constitution.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Part 1. Constitutionality of issuing exterritorial subpoenas to non-resident
witnesses to testify before the SC-SL.
Under Chapter XIII entitled Miscellaneous, the Constitution of Sierra Leone is

declared to be the supreme law of the land and any law that is inconsistent with any of the
provisions shall be found to be void or of no effect.17 With this in mind the Constitution
provides that any body of the government that has the power to make laws, may make them to
have extraterritorial operation.18 Under the Authority of the President (who has the power to
enter into treaties) and his power according to section 40(4) of the Constitution19, the
Government of Sierra Leone entered into a treaty with the United Nations thus creating the
SC-SL20. The Defense Counsel in Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon contented that the SC-SL had

17

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 is composed of 14 chapters and 1 amendment. Chapter I-Discuss the
formation of the Republic of Sierra Leone and what are its extrinsic symbols such as flag, national anthem, and
seal; Chapter II-Focuses on the Fundamental Principles of State Policy; Chapter III-Addresses the Recognition
and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual; Chapter IV-Shows how the
People will be Represented; Chapter V-Discusses the Executive Branch of the Government; Chapter VIDiscusses the Legislative Branch; Chapter VII-Discusses the Judiciary; VIII-Describes the opening of an office
of Ombudsman; Chapter IX-Commissions of Inquiry; Chapter X- The Public Service such as the Police and
other public works; Chapter XI-Discusses the Armed Forces; Chapter XII-Discusses the Laws of Sierra Leone;
Chapter XIII-Miscellaneous section which includes definitions of words used in the Constitution as well as short
analysis of any ambiguities in the language used in the Constitution; Chapter XIV-Focuses on the Transitional
Provisions necessary to make this Constitution effective; and one Amendment. (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook I TAB 5)

18

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 Chapter VIII Sec. 172 paragraph 3(a). (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook I TAB 5).
19

The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 Chapter V (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 5).

20

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7).
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no legal and Constitutional standing in Sierra Leone.21 The Appeals Chamber of the SC-SL
determined under Rule 72(E)22 that it has the competence to determine whether or not the SCSL has the jurisdiction to decide on the law fullness and validity of its creation.23 In addition,
as referenced in the Statute of the Special Court, the SC-SL is mandated to interpret the
provisions that created its institution.24 The Judges in Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon responded
to Defense Counsel directly with four main reasons why the SC-SL does abide by the
Constitution: 1) The SC-SL was not part of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone and therefore free
from relying on the Chief Justice of the Sierra Leone Supreme Court 2) Unlike the Judiciary
of Sierra Leone the SC-SL and the ability to enter into agreements with States that may be
necessary thus giving the SC-SL treaty making power 3) The SC-SL being a treaty-based
organization is not “anchored in any existing system25 4) The SC-SL is established outside of
the national court system.26 Therefore the SC-SL is created in accordance with section

21

Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et. al (“Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction”) SCSL-2004-14AR72(E) see para. 47: “Counsel for the Accused Hinga Norman…contends that the creation of the Special Court
by the Government “in agreement with the United Nations by virtue of the Special Court Agreement 2000
(Ratification) Act 2000 in effect amends fundamental aspects of the Constitution of Sierra Leone for which no
referendum was held.” Counsel for the Accused Hinga Norman goes on to argue that the establishment of the
Special Court clearly amends the judicial framework and Court structure in Sierra Leone and cites section 120(1)
of the Constitution. See The Constitution of Sierra Leone which states that the “Judicial power of Sierra Leone
shall be vested in the Judiciary of which the Chief Justice shall be the head.” (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I TAB 2)

22

SC-SL Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 49).

23

Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et. al (“Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction”) SCSL-2004-14AR72(E) see para. 34 (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 2).

24

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. see preamble (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I
TAB 8).

25

i.e. United Nations administrative law or the national law of the State of the seat

26

Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon et. al (“Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction”) SCSL-2004-14AR72(E) see para. 49, 50, 51, 52. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 2).
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40(4). Furthermore, it appears that the Rules27 must be guided by the jurisprudences of the
ICTY28, ICTR29 and Sierra Leone courts. This would appear to follow not only from the
origin of the Rules and the fact that the Sierra Leone jurisprudence is minimal at the present
moment, but also from Article 20(3) of the Statute.30
Definition and use of “subpoenas” in International Tribunal Context
The definition of the word “subpoena” has been described in great detail in the Blaskic
decision before ICTY.31 Here the Appeals Chamber stated that the term subpoena32 should be
construed “as referring only and exclusively to binding orders addressed by the International

27

SC-SL Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 49).

28

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will be referred to as (“ICTY”) for the
remainder of this Memorandum.

29

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda will be referred to as (“ICTR”) for the remainder of this
Memorandum.

30

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Article 20(3) which reads: “The Judges of the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In the interpretation and application of the laws of Sierra
Leone, they shall be guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone”. (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook I TAB 8).

31

The term "subpoena" in the English text should not be construed as always meaning a compulsory order not
capable of being enforced by a penalty; rather, in light of the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam
pereat), that word should be given a narrow interpretation: it should only refer to compulsory orders, implying
the possible imposition of a penalty, issued to individuals acting in their private capacity. Blaskic, Case No. IT95-14-AR108 bis, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial
Chamber II of 18 July 1997, reg. Pg. nos. 1908-1851 (29 Oct. 1997) (Appeals Chamber Subpoena Decision) at
para. 21. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 23).

32

The Dictionary of Law under the Oxford University Press defines subpoena duces tecum in the modern
language as being a witness summons.32 It is “an order to a person to appear in a court on a certain day to give
evidence. Before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999, this order was known as a subpoena.
The party calling the witness must pay his reasonable expenses. A witness who fails to comply with the order is
in contempt of court. The order is made under penalty of fine or imprisonment for default. There are two kinds
of witness summons: a summons requiring a person to give evidence (formerly called a subpoena ad
testificandum); and a summons requiring him to produce particular documents that are required as evidence
(formerly called a subpoena duces tecum).”32 http://www.oxforddictionary.com/law.

14

Tribunal, under threat of penalty, to individuals acting in their private capacity.”33 This
definition has not been officially adopted by the SC-SL, however the Judges of the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court are instructed in Article 20(3) of the Statute34 that they should
look in the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence for guidance in their decision making process.
Further, the ICTY elaborated on the consequences of breaching a jus cogens norm in
the Furundzija case concerning the crime of torture.35 In terms of the criminal liability, the
Tribunal found that one of the consequences upon the prohibition of torture is that “every
State is entitled to investigate, prosecute, and punish or extradite individuals accused of
torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction.”36 This seems to suggest that that
the ICTY has not only a right to prosecute and to investigate these jus cogens37 crimes, but it
also implies that the ICTY has a mandatory obligation. Therefore the power to subpoena
witnesses under the duty to investigate, would allow the court to seek out in all nations
witnesses who would able to provide the necessary information to assist in the prosecution or
acquittal of potential criminals.

33

Blaskic. at para. 21. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 23).

34

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Article 20(3) (Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook I TAB 8).

35

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998 (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook II TAB 46).

36

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998 paras. 153-157 (Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook II TAB 46).
37

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998 para. 156. referring to Demjanuk
v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 46).

15

Hybrid nature of the court provides a unique approach to constitutionality
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is a hybrid court of an international and a domestic
nature. 38 It is not exclusively one or the other. It was created by a treaty between the
sovereign nation of Sierra Leone39 and the United Nations, a treaty organization with nearly
every nation state participating as a party. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is both domestic and
international in nature.40 The judges and officers sitting on the Special Court are made up of
both natives of Sierra Leone and members of the international legal community.41 The Court
is located within Sierra Leone but funded by foreign state contributions.42 The hybrid nature
of the Court means that it is at once national and international without division or
separation.43

38

Schocken, at 436-37. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 22).

39

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone at Preamble. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7).

40

The SCSL Statute: Article 2-5. (Article 2 grants jurisdiction to the SCSL for crimes against humanity; Article
3: grants jurisdiction for violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocals
II; Article 4: grants jurisdiction over other serious violations of international humanitarian law; Article 5 grants
jurisdiction over crimes under Sierra Leone law. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 8).

41

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone. See Article 2: Composition of the Special Court and Appointment of Judges.
Two judges are appointed by the Secretary General upon nominations forwarded by States and three judges are
appointed by the government of Sierra Leone. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7).

42

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Article 6: Expenses of the Court are paid by voluntary contributions by the
international community; Article 10: Seat of the Special Court. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I
TAB 8).

43

Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council. The letter contained a letter from the President of Sierra
Leone requesting assistance in the formation of the SCSL as well as a discussion of the hybrid nature of the
court. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 50).
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Hybrid nature of the Court affects the obligations of third-party states to assist in
the subpoena of witnesses in their countries.
The Court’s ability to summon witnesses is recognized by the characteristic of duality
of the Court’s function. However, issues arise in regard to subpoenaing witnesses’
extraterritorially because the Court was not granted Chapter VII authority by the Security
Council.44 The SC-SL had requested the Security Council of the United Nations for the
expanded mandate because it would legally require all nations to cooperate with the Court
however the Security Council felt that there were other items that were of greater importance
then to grant the SC-SL Chapter VII power.45 The Court has primacy over domestic courts
within Sierra Leone, but not courts abroad.46 Those who have been subpoenaed residing
abroad, while within the Court’s explicit jurisdictional mandate, are outside the reach of its
enforcement authority.47 Despite the fact that this is deemed by the public as an International
Court, it does not necessarily preclude the national nature of the Court. The Sierra Leone
government came to the United Nations for assistance in the prosecution of the instigators of

44

See SCSL Agreement for general information. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7).Also see
Security Council Resolution 1315(2000) at note 15: the resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to negotiate
an agreement with Sierra-Leone in which there is no mention of Chapter VII authority given to the court.
(Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 3)

45

Global Policy Forum “Special Court Requests Expanded Mandate” see Reuters June 11, 2003.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2003/0612moremandate.htm (Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook II TAB 44).
46

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Article 8: Grants concurrent jurisdiction and states that the SCSL will have
primacy over domestic courts. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7).

47

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: Grants organs law making authority when deemed necessary or
preferable. Absent this authority the cornerstone of international law remains intact: the sovereignty of the state
prevails over all claims over its sovereignty absent an external obligation under international law. (Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook I TAB 11).
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war crimes within the Sierra Leone territory against Sierra Leoneans.48 While the world
accurately views the SC-SL as an international war crimes tribunal, third party foreign states
must recognize the domestic aspect of the Court as an inherent part of its structure.
Investigatory powers of the Prosecutor
Pursuant to article 15(1) of the Statute of the Special Court, the Prosecutor is
“responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes under Sierra
Leone law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”49 In carrying
out these responsibilities, the Prosecutor is mandated by the Statute to “act independently as a
separate organ of the Special Court.”50 The Prosecutor also is commanded not to “seek or
receive instructions from any Government or from any other source.”51
To fulfill these responsibilities, article 15(2) of the Statute provides the Office of the
Prosecutor with the power “to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence
48
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and to conduct on-site investigations.”52 It also provides that the Prosecutor shall have the
assistance of Sierra Leonean authorities; by article 17(1) of the Agreement, Sierra Leone has
already undertaken to “facilitate access to the Prosecutor to sites, persons and relevant
documents required for the investigation.”53
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court provide additional
information with respect to how the Prosecutor may exercise these investigatory powers. Rule
2 defines an “investigation” as “[a]ll activities undertaken by the Prosecutor under the Statute
and the Rules for the collection of information and evidence, whether before or after approval
of an indictment”.54 Then, echoing but not specifically referring to the provisions of article 15
of the Statute, Rule 39 provides that “[i]n the conduct of an investigation” the Prosecutor may
“[s]ummon and question suspects, interview victims and witnesses and record their
statements, collect evidence and conduct on-site investigations”.55 Rule 39 also provides that
the Prosecutor may “[t]ake all measures deemed necessary for the purpose of the
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investigation, including the taking of any special measures to provide for the safety, the
support and the assistance of potential witnesses and sources”.56 In addition, Rule 39
acknowledges that the Prosecutor may need to see the assistance of State authorities as well as
relevant international bodies, including the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL), and invites the Prosecutor to “[r]equest such orders as may be necessary [in the
conduct of an investigation] from a Trial Chamber or a Judge.”57
Finally, the Rules assign to the Prosecutor the responsibility for the “preservation,
storage and security of information and physical evidence obtained in the course of his [sic]
investigations.”58 Rule 41(B) further requires the Prosecutor to produce an inventory of all
materials seized from the accused, serve a copy of the inventory on the accused and return
without delay to the accused materials that are of no evidentiary value.59
All of these provisions suggest that the Prosecutor has the power to utilize outside sources to
get information regarding witnesses and therefore the ability to subpoena.
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Requests by the SC-SL
A request is not expressly defined in the Agreement, the Statute, the Rules or Sierra
Leone’s Special Court Agreement Ratification Act. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged by Rule
8 to be a form of communication that may be used by any organ of the Court to obtain
assistance.60 According to the Agreement, Statute, Rules and Ratification Act, requests may
be made by organs of the Court to obtain assistance from a State with regard to deferral,
discontinuance, identification and location of persons, service of documents, arrest or
detention of persons and transfer of an indictee to the Court. Rule 8(E) also specifies that the
Prosecutor may request a State “to forward to him [sic] all relevant information” regarding “a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Court [that] is or has been the subject of
investigations or criminal proceedings instituted in the courts of any State.”61 These examples,
however, are not exhaustive. Article 17 of the Agreement and section 15 of the Ratification
Act make clear that by noting these examples, they are not limiting the subjects of potential
requests.62
As mandated by article 17(2) of the Agreement, and acknowledged in Rule 8, the
Government of Sierra Leone, as the legal representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone, must
60
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“comply without undue delay with any request for assistance by the Special Court”. In order
to meet the requirements of this obligation, Sierra Leone provided for a procedure for
responses to requests in its Special Court Agreement Ratification Act.63
Pursuant to section 15(1) of the Ratification Act, “upon receiving from the Special
Court a request for assistance”, the Attorney-General of Sierra Leone must consider such
request “without any undue delay”.64 In accordance with section 18(1), the Attorney-General
must then, without undue delay, notify the Court “of his response to a request and the
outcome of any action that has been taken in relation to it.”65
In execution of a request, the Ratification Act mandates strict adherence to the terms
of such request. Section 16 states that if a request for assistance specifies that it should be
executed in a particular manner that is not prohibited by Sierra Leone law, the Attorney
General must ensure that the request is executed in that manner.66 Moreover, under section 17,
adherence to the terms of a request is specified to include maintenance of the confidentiality
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The Special Court Agreement Ratification Act also sets out a procedure for requests for assistance from Sierra
Leone to the Special Court. Under section 19(1) of the Ratification Act, the Attorney-General of Sierra Leone
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of the request where required by the Court, except to the extent that disclosure of the request
is necessary for its execution.67
The procedure in the Ratification Act also recognizes that there might be an instance
in which the Attorney General must refuse or postpone compliance with a request. Section 18
provides that in such instances the Attorney General must notify the Special Court and
provide the reasons for such failure to comply.68 This procedure appears designed to resolve
situations in which compliance with a request might violate the existing laws of Sierra Leone
or might be impossible without judicial order. For example, in the case of a request that would
require disclosure of “material that may be prejudicial to the national security of the Republic
of Sierra Leone”, section 18(4) provides that the Attorney General shall “without undue delay,
notify the Special Court of that fact together with the reasons therefore.”69 Once the Court
receives this response, a Judge of the Court may order disclosure of the material, which is
recognized by the Ratification Act to be authorization for disclosure that otherwise would
have been prohibited under Sierra Leone’s national security laws.
Ultimately, the Government of Sierra Leone has undertaken to comply with requests
for assistance from the Special Court and Rule 8 acknowledges this obligation. Rule 8(B)
provides that, in general, “where a Chamber or a Judge is satisfied that the Government of
Sierra Leone has failed to comply with a request made in relation to any proceedings before
67

The Special Court Agreement, 2002, Ratification Act, 2002 section 17. (Reproduced in the accompanying
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that Chamber or Judge, the Chamber or Judge may refer the matter to the President to take
appropriate action.”70 Before taking such step, however, it is likely that the Chamber or Judge
would issue an order, which, as noted above in the case of a request for material that may be
prejudicial to national security, is necessary in certain instances to facilitate compliance by
Sierra Leone.
States other than Sierra Leone are not obliged to cooperate with the Court’s requests,
but are encouraged to do so by the UN Security Council and the Management Committee for
the Special Court. Since there is no formal obligation of cooperation on the part of States
other than Sierra Leone, there is no established procedure for responding to a request.
For this reason, Rule 8 foresees that the Court might enter into agreements or ad hoc
arrangements for cooperation that would include a procedure for compliance with a request.71
Rule 8 also foresees enforcement of such ad hoc arrangements or agreements. In such cases, it
provides that if a State “fails to cooperate” with the Court’s requests, the Court’s “President
may take appropriate action.”72
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Rule 8(B) states that there are four exceptions to this general rule: “cases to which Rule 11, 13, 59 or
applies”. Rule 13 sets out specific procedures regarding requests and orders for discontinuance,
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Ultimately, it is possible that, if a State refuses to cooperate with a request that is
critical to an organ of the Special Court, the Court might appeal to the Management
Committee and invite one of its member States to appeal to the UN Security Council for
assistance in obtaining cooperation. Prior to undertaking this step, however, it is likely that the
Court would exhaust any available alternative, including all diplomatic means of securing
cooperation.
Orders in the SC-SL
In accordance with the Agreement, the Statute and the Rules, an order may be issued
by a Chamber or by a Judge. Sierra Leone’s Special Court Agreement Ratification Act takes
an additional step and defines an “order of the Special Court” to mean “any order, summons,
subpoena, warrant, transfer order or any other order issued by a judge of the Special Court”.73
These documents also acknowledge that, without limitation, an order may be issued regarding
any of the examples of potential requests noted in the previous section. With respect to the
form of an order, however, they provide no direction, leaving this matter to the discretion of
the Judges of the Court.
In Sierra Leone, the obligation to comply with orders of the Court is absolute. Section
21(2) of the Special Court Agreement Ratification Act establishes that an order of the Special
Court is binding on “every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under
Sierra Leone law.”74 Regarding procedures for compliance with an order, section 21(1) of the
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Special Court Agreement Ratification Act, s. 1. This mirrors Rule 54 of the Special Court Rules, based
on the ICTR equivalent, which provides for the power of a Judge or Chamber to issue “orders,
summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders”. (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I TAB 7).
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obstructs–(a) an official of the Special Court in the execution of his duty, or any person lawfully acting in aid of
such an official; or (b) any person executing an order of the Special Court, commits an offence and shall be
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Act provides that “any person executing an order of the Special Court shall comply with any
direction specified in that order.”75 In particular, with respect to the execution of an order for
seizure of documents or other tangible objects, section 21(3) requires such items to be
delivered “forthwith” into the custody of the Special Court, even if that is not specified in the
order. Finally, section 21(4) requires that “[i]f a person to whom an order of the Special Court
is directed is unable to execute that order, he [sic] shall report forthwith the inability to the
Special Court and give the reasons therefore.”76 This section of the Ratification Act facilitates
compliance with provisions such as Rule 59, which sets out a requirement for the reporting
forthwith by Sierra Leone authorities of any inability to execute a warrant of arrest or transfer
order that has been transmitted to them.77
States other than Sierra Leone are not obliged to comply with the Court’s orders, but
are encouraged to do so. Thus, as is the case with requests, since there is no formal obligation
on the part of States other than Sierra Leone, there is no established procedure for compliance
with an order. Rather, States are encouraged to negotiate such a procedure with the Court. If a
State refuses to comply with an order, the Special Court retains the option of appealing to the
liable on conviction, to a fine not exceeding two million leones or to a term.” Also referenced in: No Peace
Without Justice. Lawyer’s Guide to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, March 2004.
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Management Committee and inviting one of its member States to appeal to the UN Security
Council for assistance in obtaining compliance.78
Part 2. Various Nation Approach
United States Approach
Historically, the United States has exercised sovereignty in various locations outside of its
national borders.79 United States law on jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes has been
expanding, and with this expansion the rights of witnesses to be compelled to testify before
the court has also increased. This expansion is apparent in relation to violations of 1) antitrust
laws80; 2) securities laws81 3) conspiracy to import narcotics.82 However, the paramount case
on whether extraterritorial subpoenas are constitutional is Blackmer v. United States.83 In
Blackmer84, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Walsh Act85,
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which authorizes federal courts to subpoena United States nationals or residents living abroad.
Blackmer, a United States citizen residing in France, was served in France with two
subpoenas requiring him to appear at different times as a witness in a criminal trial pending in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.86 Blackmer failed to honor the subpoenas
and, after a hearing, the District of Columbia court held him in contempt and fined him $
30,000 in each case.87 His property was seized to satisfy the judgments.88 The court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the decree.
In concluding that the statute did not violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, a unanimous Supreme Court resorted to a vertical sovereignty theory: in that
[Blackmer] continued to owe allegiance to the United States. By virtue of the obligations of
citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him. . . . Nor can it be doubted that
the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return to this
country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it. Despite the
potentially enormous universal burdens Blackmer would suffer from being forced to travel
from France to the United States twice, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
extraterritorial subpoenas.89
According to Blackmer, the due process clause contains no absolute mileage limitation on
the distance an "innocent" non-party witness may be required to travel to fulfill her civic duty
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29).

87

Blackmer (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 29)

88

Blackmer (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 29).

89

Blackmer (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 29).

28

to testify.90 Two factors, however, limit the applicability of Blackmer's holding to assertions
of extraterritorial subpoena power by the states. First, Blackmer's vertical sovereignty
rationale would support only assertions of subpoena power over persons within the territory of
the government that created the court, or over citizens of the forum state.91 It would not
support subpoena power over persons who simply have "minimum contacts" with the
jurisdiction, or others over whom assertions of extraterritorial subpoena power might be
reasonable.
Second, courts should question the continued viability of any theory predicated solely on
the "power of the sovereign." The Supreme Court in Ireland92 rejected the proposition that a
state's power to compel nonresident defendants to defend actions brought against them in the
state must be limited out of concern for the sovereignty of other states. Furthermore, the
Court in Shaffer v. Heitner93 rejected the proposition that a state court necessarily has
jurisdiction over all property within the territory of the state. If analyzed together Ireland and
Shaffer render suspect the proposition that a state necessarily has unrestrained power over all
persons served while physically present within its territory, and even over all domiciliaries,
regardless of the amount of ongoing contact they have with the state.
Despite these limitations, Blackmer and the Walsh Act remain are the most relevant to the
issue of extraterritorial state court subpoena power. Without reference to the power of the
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sovereign, courts could uphold the constitutionality of the Walsh Act on the theory that
citizens of the United States are presumed to have sufficient contact with the country to
support assertions of subpoena power over them by the United States. Even more generally, a
court could hold that it is neither unreasonable nor unfair to require United States citizens
residing abroad to testify in United States courts when they will be compensated for their time
and travel expenses. Essentially Blackmer would support the proposition that a state may
assert extraterritorial subpoena power over nonresidents as long as asserting such subpoena
power would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."94
The root of the power to issue extraterritorial subpoenas rests in statutes of the United
States. 28 USCS § 178395 is a rarely invoked provision that empowers federal courts to issue
subpoenas on United States residents or nationals who are in a foreign country. The subpoena
can require persons to produce documents or other things or to appear before the court or
another designated place for testimony. As mentioned in Blackmer, the Supreme Court
sanctioned Congress's sovereign authority to recall its citizens and residents to complete
certain civic duties, such as assisting the administration of justice.96 The statute is applicable
only to U.S. citizens and residents, and subpoenas served on a non-resident alien abroad are
void.97 This power is somewhat analogous to an exercise of a “long-arm jurisdiction” in that
citizenship and residency may constitute "minimum contacts" with the United States, and thus
it is not unfair to ask citizens and residents to return to this country to testify. Section 1783
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establishes separate criteria for obtaining a subpoena in criminal and civil cases. A Section
1783 subpoena is available in all criminal proceedings, including grand jury proceedings,
provided the testimony or other evidence is necessary "in the interest of justice." Failure to
appear or produce as ordered under § 1783 is punishable as contempt pursuant to the
procedures set forth in 28 USCS § 1784.
As mentioned in this section, the United States has constitutionally recognized the ability
to issue extraterritorial subpoenas. However, The Supreme Court has held that, for U.S.
legislation to have extraterritorial application, Congress must state so explicitly.98 The
method by which it employs these subpoenas appears to be focused on the relevant
importance of obtaining the evidence and testimony of the witness. As the Court held in
United States v. Bowman, criminal statutes that are enacted because of the government’s right
to defend itself must apply abroad; otherwise “to limit their locus to the strictly territorial
jurisdiction would…greatly curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute.”99 Under the
Hague Evidence Convention, diplomatic officers, consular agents and commissioners may not
use compulsion to take the evidence of any witness, including their own nationals,100 unless
application is made to the local authorities for the use of compulsion and the application is
granted.101 This clearly eliminates the use of the Walsh Act subpoena in a Convention
country when the American court has designated a consul or commissioner to serve the
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subpoena. Such action may constitute a breach of treaty obligations and would violate
international law. But the Hague Service Convention provides that American consular
officers are free to serve subpoenas upon United States nationals in Conventions countries
requiring them to return to the United States to give testimony.102 Thus the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the issuance of extraterritorial subpoenas but limits their uses. The Walsh Act
as well as other Congressional instruments applies to equally to parties and nonparties, but the
Walsh Act considers the issuance of a extraterritorial subpoena a “last resort” method to
obtaining evidence needed in a given trial.103
Australian Approach
The Australian Courts have dealt with the constitutionality of extraterritorial
subpoenas rarely in their jurisprudence. However, this matter is dealt with comprehensively
in the unreported judgment of Rogers CJ Commercial Division of the Supreme Court of NSW
in Arhill Pty. Limited v. General Terminal Company Pty. Limited & Ors (1990) 23 NSWLR
545.104 In that case His Honour noted that Part 37 Rule 2 Supreme Court Rules (NSW)105
give the court the power to issue subpoenas in completely general terms.106 His Honour then
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referred to Part 10 of the Supreme Court Rules dealing with service outside the State
(referring to both within Australia and also outside of Australia.107 His Honour took the view
that Part 10 Rule 3 was authority for the Court to give leave to serve a subpoena outside
Australia. His Honour stated that:
“The fact that an order made pursuant to it could, in some instances, involve an
infringement of the sovereignty of another country does not mean that it is a
reason for holding the rule to be invalid. Nonetheless the rule should be
construed consistently with the established criteria of international law with
regard to comity.”108
The Australian approach thus understands the political ramifications of the issuance of
extraterritorial subpoenas but refuses to find them to be unconstitutional on their face.

Part 3. Duty of the Government of Sierra Leone and the Obligation of States
State cooperation with the SC-SL depends on the terms of the relationship between an
individual and the Court. While these terms differ, all relationships with the Court find
themselves on the basis of the Court’s basic documents: the Agreement109, the Statute110, and
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NSW LEXIS 9077 at 23 (Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II TAB 41).
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the Rules of Procedure and Evidence111. These are the documents that help to establish a
structure for the Court’s relationships.
The two modes of communication that are recognized by the Court are requests and
orders. A request may be issued by any of the organs of the Court.112 An order only may be
issued by the Chambers.113
The various “basic documents” in addition to the Sierra Leone Special Court
Agreement Ratification Act establish obligations to cooperate with all organs of the Court and
comply will all orders of the Court. However, this obligation to cooperate is non-existent for
third-party states. Rather, States are encouraged to cooperate with the Court and if possible
enter into agreements of cooperation with the Court.
1. Obligation of Sierra Leone
The Government of Sierra Leone is obliged to cooperate with the Special Court’s
requests and comply with its orders.114 Pursuant to article 17(1) of the Agreement, and as
acknowledged in Rule 8, the Government of Sierra Leone is obliged to cooperate with “all
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organs of the Special Court at all stages of the proceedings”.115 In particular, the Government
is obliged to “facilitate access to the Prosecutor to sites, persons and relevant documents
required for the investigation”.116 Furthermore, under article 17(2) of the Agreement, the
Government of Sierra Leone must “comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance by the Special Court”.117 The Government also must “comply without undue delay
with … an order issued by the Chambers”.118
With the enactment of the Special Court Agreement, 2002 (Ratification) Act,
2002,Sierra Leone incorporated these obligations into its national laws.119 Sections 14 through
18 of the Ratification Act establish a framework for cooperation with requests from the
organs of the Court.120 Section 20 of the Act provides that an order issued by the Chambers of
the Special Court is binding in Sierra Leone and states that it has “the same force or effect as
if it had been issued by a Judge, Magistrate or Justice of the Peace of a Sierra Leone court.”121
115
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Moreover, section 21 of the Act mandates that “any person” who executes the order must
comply with “any direction specified in that order” and that “every natural person,
corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any
direction specified in an order of the Special Court.”122
2.Obligation of third-party States
States other than Sierra Leone are not obliged to cooperate with the Court’s requests
or comply with its orders. The Agreement, the Statute, the Rules and Sierra Leone’s
Ratification Act only establish obligations to cooperate and comply on the part of Sierra
Leone, not other States. States other than Sierra Leone are instead encouraged to cooperate
with the Special Court. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 1470 “urges all States
to cooperate fully with the Court”.123 The Management Committee for the Special Court also
has, as one of its functions, the responsibility to “[e]ncourage all States to cooperate with the
Special Court”.124 In its Rules, the Special Court has anticipated that such encouragement
might result in cooperation and compliance by other States. For example, Rule 8(C) foresees
that the Court may invite other States to provide assistance to the Court “on the basis of an ad
hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.”125
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3. Duty to Prosecute for Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
The four Geneva Conventions were negotiated in 1949 and two protocols were
adopted later in 1977126, which were intended to solidify and codify international law with
respect to the protection of civilians in occupied territories and prisoners of war.127 Regarding
conventional warfare, the language is broad and creates actual duties with definite obligations
to enforce the law. Persons who violate the treaties are designated as “war criminals” and are
held to be personally liable for their criminal actions.128 In addition, State parties have a duty
to search for, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions.129 These duties, however, are limited by specific factors that have narrowed its
application quite severely in modern times. The duty to prosecute grave breaches under the
Geneva Conventions is limited to the context of international armed conflict.130 The armed
conflict aspect of the requirement meets the high threshold of violence that constitutes a
genuine armed conflict—it needs to be more than low levels of disturbances such as riots or
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isolated and sporadic fighting.131 The war in Sierra Leone may be viewed as an international
armed conflict because of the nature of the persons involved.
5. Obligations to Subpoena Under the U.N. Charter
Neighbor states of Sierra Leone as member of the United Nations have accepted
certain obligations set forth in Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.132 This article lists the principles
that each member state must act in accordance with in order to comply with the Purposes of
the Charter.133 Article 2(2) states: “All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the present Charter.”134
Additionally, Article 2(5) states: “All Members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
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enforcement action.”135 Neighbor countries who are members of the United Nations have a
clear and explicit obligation to act in accordance with U.N. action and not contrary to the
Purposes of the U.N. organization. These countries further have obligations under Chapter V
“The Security Council” where each member agreed in Article 24(1) “In order to ensure
prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf.”136 And then in Article 25: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in Accordance with the present Charter.”137
The Security Council acted in response to the threat to international peace and security
in Sierra Leone during its decade-long civil war. The Security Council passed a series of
resolutions during the past ten years ranging from deploying peace keeping troops to setting
up a Truth and Reconciliation Committee in the country.138 It is important to note that these
resolutions, including the resolution granting the Secretary-General the authority to negotiate
an agreement for an international tribunal, were not passed with Chapter VII authority. This
means that the SC-SL does not have primacy over third party sovereigns to demand
compliance with its rulings. Thus, on the surface, a third party sovereign has no duty to
answer to or comply with the SC-SL’s orders or rulings. The Court’s lack of direct authority
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over third party sovereign’s does not, however, allow these third party sovereigns to derogate
from Security Council Resolutions. Each member has a treaty obligation under international
law to fully comply with these resolutions.
The Security Council passed Resolution 1315 (2000), which was adopted on August
14, 2000, and it authorized the Secretary-General to negotiate with Sierra Leone in setting up
a Special Court to prosecute the individuals with the greatest responsibility for the atrocities
within Sierra Leone. The preamble of this resolution explicitly noted the “pressing need for
international cooperation to assist in strengthening the judicial system of Sierra Leone.” The
resolution also reaffirmed in the preamble “the importance of compliance with the
international humanitarian law, and reaffirming further that persons who commit or authorize
serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and
accountable for those violations and that the international community will exert every effort to
bring those responsible to justice in accordance with international standard of justice, fairness,
and due process of law.” The Security Council clearly emphasized the importance of
international cooperation, namely the obligations of Members to cooperate with the Special
Court, to end impunity for war crimes and bring about peace, security, and stability in the
region.139 The Security Council then acknowledged and “welcomed” the final agreement
between the Special Court and the U.N. in Resolution 1400 (2002) while in Resolution 1436
(2002), the Security Council “welcome[d] the launch of the Special Court for Sierra Leon
emphasizing the importance in taking effective action on impunity and accountability and in
promoting reconciliation” in the preamble. In clause 10 of the resolution the Security Council
“reiterate[d] its strong support for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, welcome[d] the start of
139
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the Court’s operations, encourage[d] donors to contribute generously to the Trust Fund for the
Special Court and to disburse existing pledges rapidly.”
Members of the U.N. have an obligation to act in accordance with these resolutions.140
The Security Council created the Special Court for Sierra Leone with the express intent to end
impunity for the atrocities committed in the country.141 The resolutions clearly require
Members, at a very minimum, not to frustrate the process of bringing war criminals to justice
in the Special Court. Under Article 2(5) of the Charter, Member states have an affirmative
duty to act in accordance with and give every assistance to the U.N.142 While the Court is not
an organ of the U.N.; it was created by the hands and at the will of the law making body of the
U.N. Member states agreed in Article 24 to “confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” The
Security Council determined that the unprecedented atrocities occurring in the region were a
threat to international peace and security.143 They created a Court to deal with the crisis.
Members are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Council.
One country in particular that has not been of assistance to the prosecutorial process is
Nigeria which is currently sheltering one of a handful of indictees of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone through an express agreement with this individual who has been accused of the
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most egregious crimes against humanity.144 The Security Council decided to limit the Court’s
jurisdiction to those with the “greatest responsibility.”145 The Council made the determination
that prosecution of this small class of criminals was the best way to promote peace and
security in the region. Nigeria granted one of these individuals, Charles Taylor, political
asylum in its borders after this individual’s indictment was released. Nigeria may be skirting
its obligations under the U.N. Charter to give assistance to the SC-SL. Not only is it failing to
render assistance, it is actually undermining the efforts of the Court by creating a major
obstacle in the court’s pursuit of justice. Nigeria may be in violation of the U.N. Charter and
thus should be instructed to assists in the subpoenaing of witnesses in its country.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The recognition of the horrors that occurred in Sierra Leone by the international

community is well documented. With this recognition, comes the duty to assist in the
prosecution of those most responsible for the atrocities. The SC-SL has the ability
constitutionally to issue extraterritorial subpoenas to non-resident witness as evidenced in
this memorandum. With this ability to issue subpoenas the Court is only stopped by the
lack of cooperation of neighbor states. With the lack of formal bilateral treaties existing
between Sierra Leone and nations where likely witnesses of crimes that occurred in Sierra
Leone are located (i.e. Liberia, Nigeria and other neighboring African nations) feel there
is no duty to abide by requests or demands for summons to the courts of Sierra Leone.
The question of state sovereignty is something that may be explored further in the context
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of this particular issue. States are reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty and therefore
will not cooperate with the SC-SL. As has been noted earlier, the Security Council has
not granted Chapter VII power to the SC-SL however, the SC-SL still has the power, as
any member of the United Nations, to approach the Security Council to ask them to assist
in the enforcement of such orders as subpoenas.146 This leaves the proverbial “door open”
for the SC-SL to attempt to enforce its various order. Even under Chapter VII power the
ICTY, and ICTR must request the Security Council to enforce their orders since they do
not have any direct enforcement arm in their respective Courts.147 It appears that the next
step for the SC-SL is to begin to use its treaty making ability to further buttress its quest
for justice by entering into various agreements with States where most of the witnesses
that fled the violence in Sierra Leone now live.148
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